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Abstract
This paper examines the effect on the firm’s banking cost of the issue of debt securities.
We argue over the existence of a positive relationship between the issue of market debt
and the reduction of firm’s banking cost. This idea relies on three main arguments: i)
Banks can delegate to investors the supervision task, a feature that makes bank
supervision less costly. ii) The issue of public debt increases firms’ bargaining power in
front of the banks, as the former can get funds through non-bank financing ch annels.
iii) Banks with no prior information on the issuing firm may interpret the issue of debt
securities as a positive signal of firm’s quality. Additionally, we argue that the previous
effects are less important for non-first issues and are sensible to the maturity of the bond
issued. We empirically test these and other related theoretical results making use of a
database of Spanish non-financial firms during the 1993-1998 period. We find empirical
support for our theoretical contentions.
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31. INTRODUCTION
It exists an important amount of literature that shows the positive impact of bank
supervision on the reduction of firm’s financing costs. For Spain, Zoido (1998) finds out that
those firms with banks as shareholders bear a lower financing costs than their counterparts
without banks in their ownership structure. Datta et al. [1999], for USA, study the effect of a
close bank-firm relationship on the cost of capital of the debt issued. The result is the
existence of a lower cost for those firms with close bank links.
The previous evidence seems to show the existence of a mechanism of delegation in
the task of supervision from the financial markets to the banks [Diamond, 1984]. If this is the
case, potential debtholders of bank-related firms do not need to internalize these supervision
costs, hence, reducing the returns they ask for. Moreover, the higher the bank commitment
with the firm (i.e. when there is an important amount of bank credits, especially with a long
length, Sharpe, 1990), the higher the incentives for an efficient bank supervision. This is
anticipated by the debtholders who demand a lower premium to invest in. Firms, in this
situation, will be interested in using market mechanisms to raise capital. Thus, some sort of
complementarity between bank and market debt is obtained.
Within this complementarity framework, we may argue that issuing market debt may
have a positive impact on the cost reduction of future firm’s bank credits. Thus, we propose a
relationship that moves in the opposite direction than that aforementioned. The basic
arguments are three: First, the existence of a possible cross-delegation mechanism [Booth,
1992], that would move from the bank to the debtholders. In a similar way that banks can
achieve this role for investors, the latter can do the same for the former. This will end up
generating a reduction in the firm’s bank financing costs. Moreover, market debt, differently
to bank debt, is difficult to be renegotiated. This, in turn, induces investors to supervise
efficiently in order to prevent firms getting in such a situations of not being able to attend
their financial obligations. If so, debt non-renegotiation triggers asset liquidation, with the
corresponding loss for debtholders. Banks anticipate this dynamic, and may be willing to
delegate supervision tasks in the financial markets.
A second aspect worth to consider is the reduction in the bank bargaining power when
they negotiate the credit conditions with those firms that have a non-bank financing channel.
This feature, undoubtedly, will generate a reduction in the interest rate that banks demand for
their credits [Rajan 1992].
 The last argument that may be deemed as relevant to justify the reduction in the bank
financing costs for those firms that have issued debt is based on signaling considerations. To
issue debt may be interpreted as a good signal of firm’s quality due to three main reasons.
First, the difficulty to renegotiate market debt allows separating good firms from bad ones, as
only the former can afford such a rigid financial instrument. Second, as Diamond [1991]
points out in a dynamic model of bank-firm relationships with adverse selection problems,
only those firms revealed as good through their banking relations can afford issuing debt in a
low-informed market. And third, the existence of some information revelation requirements to
attend by those debt-issuing firms precludes bad-quality firms to use market-financing
mechanisms.
As a conclusion, all the previous arguments points in the same direction: Firms that
issue debt has to bear a lower bank financing costs after they have issued this market
instrument. To this respect, Booth [1992] for USA finds out that firms with market debt bear
for their bank credits an interest rate premium over reference rates (PRIME, LIBOR, CD),
which is clearly inferior to that of their counterparts without debt issues.
4Another relevant aspect to study is the differential impact on financing costs triggered
by second debt issues in comparison to first ones. Bayless [1994] shows that markets tend to
diminish their reactions in successive issues. This feature can be interpreted [Chaplinsky and
Hansen (1991)] in terms of the lower degree of information non-anticipated by markets. Thus,
a lower reduction in bank financing costs after second debt issues in comparison to first ones
is expected. This is a consequence of the lower degree of un-anticipated information on firm’s
quality carried out by non-initial debt issues.
We contrast these theoretical contentions making use of a database of Spanish non-
financial firms for the period 1993-1998. The sample is composed of 16.020 firms. The
results we find show that firms that have issued debt bear lower financing costs than their
counterparts. Moreover, the reduction in the interest charged by banks after debt issues is
more immediate for short-term debt issues than for long-term ones. We also find that firms
with multiple debt issues show, on average, a lower reduction on credit interest rate than firms
with a unique issue, especially if this is short-term.
The paper has four more sections. In the next one we present the arguments behind the
theoretical contentions to be tested. In the third section, we contrast the theoretical
hypotheses. Discussion of the results found is made in the fourth section. The paper finishes
with some concluding remarks.
2.  THEORETICAL FUNDATIONS
The degree of competition in credit markets is a major determinant of the firm’s cost
of capital. Rajan [1992] shows that firm’s bank financing costs are directly related to banks
bargaining power, which is, among other things, a function of the degree of competition they
face from other banks to finance firms. In this line, Agarwal and Leston [2001] for Germany
and Weinstein and Yafeh [1998] for Japan, show that firms with a strong relationship with
banks (main bank system in Japan) have limited access to alternative financing sources.
Consequently, a raise in their cost of capital follows. Similarly, Hoshi et al. [1990] find that
once the Japanese bond market was liberalized, firms increased their bargaining power in
front of banks as they began to use this alternative mechanism to obtain funds. In Diamond
[1991], another aspect is introduced: The quality of the issuing firms. It is shown, in a context
with adverse selection problems, that only those bank-financed firms that have proved to be
of good quality have the possibility to obtain funds through the market. Obviously, in that
case we may speculate that banks will react to try to recover these good-quality firms by
offering them a reduction in the financing costs. This is, precisely, the point of the paper.
Booth [1992] for USA finds that those debt-issuing firms bear a cost of capital for their bank
credits lower than that of their counterparts without issued debt.
From the previous studies, a conclusion emerges: There is a positive relationship
between the reduction in banks market power, and the reduction in firms’ bank financing
costs. In our case, firms’ debt issue is what triggers the former reduction.
In another line of research, Petersen and Rajan [1995] conclude that it exists a counter
veiling effect to that previously described. This effect appears in contexts with high
information asymmetries (moral hazard combined with adverse selection). These authors
show that short-term credit interest rates are decreasing with bank market power. The reason
is that those banks with market power can afford to optimize intertemporally, without
restrictions, the rates they charge for their credits. In that case, they do in such a way to
reduce informational incentive problems. The strategy is to initially decrease the rates in order
to avoid “good” firms to be engaged in risky projects. Afterwards, once the bank has been
willing to discriminate firms according to their short-term results, it raises the (long-term)
rates proportionally to its market power. This is a way to compensate for the initial losses
5carried out by the low short-term rates policy. Finally, we should mention other studies
[Covitz, and Heitfield, 1999], which also obtain the results of Petersen and Rajan, but
focusing on double moral hazard situations (by banks and firms).
As a synthesis of the previous arguments, it seems that the key to obtain a positive or a
negative impact of bank market power on the firm’s bank financing costs is the degree of
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders.
Thus, in such a contexts with high information asymmetries, credit interest rate
decreases with bank market power. However, when information asymmetries are less
important, the previous decreasing relationship becomes an increasing one.
As we have mentioned before, bank bargaining power in negotiating with the firm, not
only depends on the degree of competition in the credit market, but also on the existence of
alternative firm’s financing channels like the debt issue. To this respect, there are three effects
that emerge once a firm starts issuing debt.
First, an increase in firm’s market power due to it exists alternative financing
mechanisms to bank credit.
Second, there is an informative signal about firm’s quality. The issue of corporate debt
is interpreted as a positive signal for those banks without initial information about the firm.
This is connected with three points. First, market debt is difficult to be renegotiated. Thus, a
firm will only use this instrument if it has a minimum quality to be able to satisfy the
corresponding payment obligations; otherwise, it risks to be liquidated [Bolton and Freixas,
2000]. The second reason to interpret debt issues positively is that issuing firms are obliged to
release internal information to the markets by the regulatory institution. This feature prevents
bad-quality firms to use this mechanism [Yosha 1995]. Finally, the third signalling argument
is based on models like Hadlock and James (2002); and Diamond (1991) where only those
initially bank-financed firms with good quality are willing to issue debt instruments. In so
doing, potential new lenders can interpret debt issues as a good signal. With this behavior,
there is a delegation of the supervision task from after-issue lenders to before-issue banks
[Johnson, 1997]. These posterior-issue banks consider these firms as good because some
initial banks judged them as good. And, precisely this judgment allowed firms to use the
market mechanism to raise capital.
As a consequence of the previous arguments, we can conclude that debt issues reduce
information asymmetries between borrowers (firms) and lenders (banks), as they can be
interpreted as firm’s good-quality signals. A reduction in firm’s cost of capital should follow.
Finally, there is a third effect, which is a continuity of the previous one. If banks take
as good the signal to raise capital through the markets, there is an implicit firm’s supervision
delegation. This feature undoubtedly will reduce bank’s supervision costs, and lately firm’s
bank financing costs.
We can synthesize the previous arguments in Figure 1.
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EFFECTS OF A DEBT ISSUE
What is relevant is that by combining the previous effects leads, on the one hand, to a
reduction of information asymmetries as well as informational costs, and, on the other hand,
to an increase in firm’s bargaining power. The conclusion: an unambiguous reduction in bank
costs after the issue. This is the central hypothesis to be tested empirically.
Hypothesis 1: Firms that issue debt pay lower interest rates for their bank credits after
the issue.
Furthermore, we should expect that those firms that have issued short-length debt,
experience the reduction in their financing costs more immediately than those other firms that
raise capital using long-length financial instruments. Once the debt issued vanishes, firms will
borrow new capital [Johnson, 1997]. It is in this moment when new credits with improved
conditions are asked for. Obviously, the shorter the length of the existing debt, the more
immediate will be the emergence of these new credits with a lower interest rate.
Hypothesis 1b: Firms that issue short-term debt experience a reduction in their cost of
capital earlier than those other firms that issue long-term debt.
Diamond [1991] argues that those firms that have proved their quality through their
banking relationships can afford to issue debt in a better conditions than those defined in the
initial bank credits. If we introduce an additional sequence to the Diamond model by allowing
banks to react to these debt issues, a natural reduction in the firm’s capital costs should
emerge as a way to retain these good-quality firms. Obviously, in so far as banks have the
perception that a firm is not eventually “recoverable” (i.e. it uses market financing
mechanisms frequently), it makes no sense to offer them a reduction in their credit cost. Firms
with multiple debt issues are natural candidates to this respect.
There is a second informational argument that is deemed to be relevant in explaining
the previous statement: Non-initial debt issues are less informative than the initial ones. In
this line, Bayless [1994] study market reaction when a firm issues equity in one case, and debt
in the other. He considers two scenarios by distinguishing initial and non-initial debt issues.
The result found is a higher differential in market reaction for initial debt issues (4.15% to
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72.88% respectively). Following the argument, Chaplinsky and Hansen [1991] show evidence
that shares react more vigorously to debt issues that convey non-anticipated information. This
empirical finding allows us to interpret the Bayless [1994] result over the lower shares
reaction to non-initial debt issues in terms of the lower informational content of these issues
in relation to the initial ones. Banks have already inferred the good quality of the issuing firm
after the initial issue. Thus, there is barely an increment of information in the following
issues. This feature limits the reduction in the credit costs of those firms with multiple issues.
This is what configures Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Those firms with multiple debt issues achieve, on average, a lower
reduction in their capital costs than those other firms with a unique debt issue.
To be more precise, the previous result is especially relevant for the case of long-term
debt issues, which are far less frequent than short-term ones. This latter debt has to be
returned (or refinanced with new issues) in one-year time. This feature, consistently with
hypothesis 2, should lead banks to concentrate the reduction of capital expenditures in those
firms that use long-term debt to raise funds, independently of the number of occasions that
have done so. A different way to get in this statement is based on the higher degree of
information carried out by long-term debt in comparison to short-term one. Investors are
aware of the superior risks of the former debt, and, in principle, they will be more demanding
on the quality of the issuing firm. Conversely, firms anticipate this feature and only those
ones with especially good quality may afford to use this financial instrument. Cai, et al [1999]
show, for Japan, that those firms with a high proportion of debt, the best ones according to
Diamond [1991], issue more long-term debt than short-term. This leads us to postulate a more
vigorous reaction of banks in reducing firm’s credit costs after a succession of different long-
term debt issues in comparison to a succession of short-term ones.
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with multiple long-term debt issues, enjoy lower credit
expenditures than those other firms that have issued short-term debt in different occasions.
Obviously, from the previous hypotheses, we may argue that firms that had issued
debt in the past, as they have obtained a reduction in their credit costs, are more willing to
borrow new capital through this channel [Johnson, 1997]. Moreover, there is a clear
preference for new credits with shorter maturities, because this allows firms to ask for a
frequently-improving financial conditions. This states the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3:  Firms that issue debt ask for more bank credits, especially with short
length, in those periods after debt issues.
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1.  SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
We carry out our empirical investigation for the period 1993-1998, making use of a
database, SABE (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Españoles), compiled by Bureau Van Dijk.
This database surveys balance sheet, income statement and other complementary financial
information of more than 200,000 Spanish companies with all sizes, and it is widely
8distributed among all economic sectors 3. To clean our initial sample, we have applied some
filters (See Appendix).
We should mention, first of all, that database design problems has obliged to focus on
short-term  bank credit costs (less than one-year maturity). The particular variable used to
measure these costs is the ratio of short-term interests of bank debt divided by short-term
bank loans. Besides, and in order to be consistent with this short-term analysis, we have
introduced an additional filter: All those observations with the previous ratio equal to 1 are
dropped. Two reasons justify this disregard. First, possible accounting mistakes. Second, and
most importantly, this unitary ratio may reflect a situation where short-term interests can just
be an accounting reclassification of an initial long-term credit interests. In that case,
obviously, this interest rates fixed in the past are not modified after current debt issues.
The final sample is an unbalanced panel data composed of 16,020 firms, with 56,484
observations. Table I reports the total amount year-by-year of the capital raised through debt
issues. We distinguish between short-term debt issued (STDI=1) and long-term debt issued
(LTDI=1). We can observe that this financing mechanism is relatively recent in Spain, until
1995 no company in the sample issued debt.
TABLE I
ANNUAL AMOUNT OF CAPITAL RAISED WITH SHORT AND LONG-TERM DEBT, 1993-1998.
(MILLION OF PESETAS )
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
STDI=1 0 0 5.250565 45,278.94 50,375.33 53,268.85
LTDI=1 0 0 611.8124 100,876.2 107,759.5 111,370.3
Total 617.06297 146,155.14 158,134.83 164,639.15
There is an increasing use of this financial instrument, a feature that is consistent with
the development of Spanish financial markets during the past decade. Furthermore, there are
some macroeconomic events that may help to explain the importance achieved by this
financing channel in Spain. First, there is a decreasing evolution of the official rates in Spain
to gain qualification for the EMU. This feature, undoubtedly, promoted debt issues. Second,
the own creation of a common financial market with a unique currency has also helped the
use of this type of financial instrument.
3.2 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
In this section, we define the variables used throughout the paper to study the effect of
firm’s issue of short and long-term debt on the evolution of their short-term bank costs. Boxes
I, II and III below report dependent, explanatory and control variables, respectively.
                                                                
3 We disregard financial firms.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES
STBC Short-term bank costs.  It is the ratio of short-term debt interests to total short-
term bank loans.
VSTBC Short-term variation of bank costs. It is the difference of STBC between
period t+1 and period t.
VSTBC1 Short-term variation of bank costs in t+1. It is the former variable one period
ahead.
VSTBC_1 Short-term variation of bank costs in t-1. It is the VSTBC variable lagged one
period.
BOX II
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
LTDI Long-term debt issued: Binary variable that it is equal to one (zero) if the
company has (not) issued long-term debt in period t.
STDI Short-term debt issued: Binary variable that it is equal to one (zero) if the
company has (not) issued short-term debt in period t.
DLTDI It is equal to one when a company has issued long-term debt in period t, and
has also done in the past. It is zero otherwise.
DSTDI It is equal to one when a company has issued short-term debt in period t, and
has also done it in the past. It is zero otherwise.
BOX III
                                                                        CONTROL VARIABLES
BDCD Bank loans to costly debt ratio. It is the ratio of the overall amount of bank
credits to the total costly debt.
CDM Costly debt maturity.  It is the ratio of short-term to long-term costly debt.
MIBOR It is the Spanish interbanking three-months rate.
LEV Leverage Ratio. It is composed by the external funds (total debt) of the
company divided by firm’s capital.
NSTBD New short-term bank loans. It is the new bank credits of a firm in period t.
NSTBD1 New short-term bank loans in t+1.
NSTBD2 New short-term bank loans in t+2.
NLTBD New long-term bank loans. It is the new bank credits of a firm in period t.
NLTBD1 New long-term bank loans in t+1.
NLTBD2 New long-term bank loans in t+2.
TANG Tangible Assets. Fixed assets to total assets.
SALES Total sales is used as a proxy for firm`s size.
ROA Return on Assets. It is the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to total
assets.
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3. 3.  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
We divide this descriptive study into two parts. First, we carry out a mean test analysis of
the differences between the new bank loans obtained by issuing and non-issuing companies
(Table II). Second, we address the question of variations in the short-term bank costs
(VSTBC) after debt issues (Table III).
TABLE II
MEAN TESTS DIFFERENCES OF NEW SHORT AND LONG-TERM BANK LOANS
STDI= 0
Mean2
STDI= 1
Mean2
P-value 1 LTDI= 0
Mean2
LTDI= 1
Mean2
P-value 1
NSTBD 15,356 3,592,594 0.00 21,573 1,756,320 0.00
NSTBD1 21,132 2,346,664 0.00 24,986 640,269 0.018
NSTBD2 14,651 2,655,020 0.00 13,959 3,584,147 0.00
NLTBD 112,530 8,600,072 0.00 112,030 1.05e+07 0.00
NLTBD1 121,392 7,561,379 0.00 121,885 8,712,855 0.00
NLTBD2 63,814 74,672 0.98 64,484 -382,076 0.38
1 All p-values are associated with the mean difference test.
2 These values are all corrected by year, size and sector. This is made taking differences
with the median for each year, sector and size (small, less than 50 employees, median
between 50 and 200 and large more than 200 employees).
Table II shows the mean test, corrected by sector, year and size, of the total amount of
new bank loans captured by issuing and non-issuing companies. We distinguish two different
situations: Short and long-term debt issues. The result is that independently of the debt
maturity, issuing firms obtain far more credits than their counterparts. It is interesting to note
that the former effect does not take place only in the issuing period, but also in the next
period, as well as in some cases two periods later. This is consistent with hypothesis 3 4.
Two additional comments can be made. First, two periods after the issue, there is no
substantial differences in the new long-term bank loans between issuing and non-issuing
firms. This is consistent with the clear preference for credits of short maturity by issuing firms
as suggested in hypothesis 3. Second, once we focus on issuing firms, those with long-term
debt, ask significantly for more bank credits later than those firms issuing short-term debt. In
particular, the increase in the new loans two periods after the issue (t+2) and the next period
of the issue (t+1) is clearly higher for the former firms than for the latter (459.79% versus
13.44%). This is reversed when we focus on more immediate periods after the issue (period
t+1 and period t). We are going to see the consistency of these results with those of the
evolution of bank credit costs (Table III). The reduction of bank credit costs after a debt issue
(which eventually triggers the demand for new credits), is less immediate after long-term debt
issues.
To inspect this feature, Table III reports the difference of short-term bank costs
between issuing and non-issuing firms. To use variations costs allows neglecting possible
long-term residual incorporated to this measure by accounting reclassification of long-term
                                                                
4 A more detailed analysis of size effects in this relationship has been undertaken (which is not explicitly
reported here). The results suggest that issuing companies are mainly the largest; however, it is no longer true
that these companies are those that ask for the higher amount of new bank credits. Therefore, the driving force of
the previous correlation is not the size.
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interests into short-term as debt approaches its extinction. This would disturb the analysis as
these “short-term” interests were contracted before the issuing period 5.
TABLE III
MEAN TEST OF DIFFERENCES IN THE VARIATIONS OF SHORT-TERM CREDIT COSTS
STDI= 0
Mean (%)
STDI=1
Mean (%)
P-value 1 LTDI= 0
Mean (%)
LTDI= 1
Mean (%)
P-value 1
VSTBC_1  2 0.33 2.09 0.00 0.33 2.97 0.00
VSTBC  2 0.34 -0.81 0.083 0.34 0.19 0.84
VSTBC1 2 0.26 -1.29 0.12 0.26 -2.37 0.02
1 These figures correspond to mean tests p-values for each variable corrected by year and sector.
 2 See variable definition in Box II.
Table III shows that in those periods where companies issue debt there is an increase
in the credit cost with regard to the pre-issue period (VSTBC_1 variable is higher). We might
speculate that debt issues can be motivated by this increase in the credit cost of capital.
However, what is relevant, is that once debt has been issued, independently of its
maturity, short-term bank costs decrease with time. To be more precise, when debt issued is
short-term (long-term), the reduction takes place one (two) period later. Therefore, we find a
persistent effect of debt issues in the credit costs reduction, and a more immediacy effect for
short maturities. This is consistent with our Hypothesis 1b. Moreover, this also conforms to
Table II where demand of new credits is concentrated in early periods (t+1) for short-term
debt issues, while it is postponed two periods later in case of debt issues of longer maturity.
In order to get robust results, we present an econometric analysis in the next section.
3. 4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS . METHODOLOGY
The empirical specification to analyze the variation of short-term credit costs
(VSTBC) is given by the following equation:
itititititit
itititititit
TANGROASALESLEV
CDMBDCDMIBORLTDISTDIVSTBC
ehybbbb
bbbbba
+++++++
++++++=
9876
54321
where ite  denotes the error coefficient, which is normally distributed with zero mean and s
2
variance.
We estimate bank variation costs considering two dummy variables for the short-term
debt issues (STDI) as well as for the long-term ones (LTDI). Additionally, some control
variables are considered which are quite common in this literature. In this sense, Ocaña et al
(1994) derive in a partial-equilibrium model an implicit expression of the firm’s cost of
capital in a competitive credit market environment. Different factors emerge: i) the risk-free
interest rate, proxied by the MIBOR variable; ii) the expected firm’s economic performance,
proxied by the ROA ratio variable; iii) firm´s size, proxied by the total amount of sales
(SALES); iv) firm’s financial leverage (LEV); v) Firm collateral, proxied by TANG; vi)
business economic risk measured by the costly debt maturity (CDM), since the lower the debt
length, the higher the risk bore by the company for a given investment return6. This feature is
                                                                
5 This process complement the filters applied in Section 3.1.
6 Mato (1989) and Segura and Toledo (2001) identified different variables of solvency like maturity as another
possible determinant of the cost of capital.
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also wrapped up in the size variable (SALES), since large companies have access to a better
diversification, which reduces their risk. Because of the specific problem we are studying, we
consider a measure of the firm bargaining power. A natural candidate is the proportion of
bank debt over total costly debt (BDCD). The higher a company bank debt level, the higher
bank capacity to impose its own interests. But, another interpretation can be admitted. A high
proportion of bank debt can be a measure of a bank commitment with the firm (Sharpe, 1990).
We will find that this last interpretation is the dominant. Finally, we allow for unobservable
heterogeneity ( ih ) and temporal effects ( ty ).
The estimation will take advantage of the panel structure of the data. This will allow to
manage the unobservable firm’s heterogeneity as well as its possible correlation with
explanatory variables (fixed effects). If this is the case, the estimations will be biased, and the
within group estimator should be used. Once we apply the Hausman test to all the
specifications, the existence of the previous correlation is confirmed, and the within group
estimation is the only consistent one. Additionally, we use the Sargan test to analyze possible
endogeneity problems not directly associated with the unobservable heterogeneity ( ih ). The
reason is that a financial decision like to issue debt can perfectly be a consequence of the
current bank credit costs. This leads to a second endogeneity problem that would make the
within groups estimator inconsistent. In order to tackle this problem, we apply the Sargan test,
which rejects this second endogeneity issue. Thus, the within groups estimator can be applied.
Table IV shows estimations of the effect of firms` debt issues with different maturities
on the variation of the short-term bank credit costs between period t+1 and period t (VSTBC).
In column (1) there is no distinction of debt issues with different maturities, while in column
(2), short-term debt issues are separated from long-term ones. Finally, in column (3), two
crossed dummies variables (DSTDI and DLTDI) are introduced. This allows distinction firms
with multiple debt issues (DSTDI=1 for long-term and DLTPDI=1 for short-term) from those
others with a unique issue.
Finally, Table IV shows the corresponding estimations to the variation of bank credit
costs between period t+1 and period t+2. Once again, Hausman tests reveal the existence of
fixed effects, and, Sargan tests do not provide evidence of the existence of the second
endogeneity problem aforementioned, so the fixed-effects estimator can also be applied.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table III shows that overall public debt issues have a negative and significant (99%)
impact on the increases of short-term credit costs. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Once
debt issues are separated by their maturity, column (2) shows the driving effect is connected
with short-term debt issues. This finding supports the evidence presented in Table III, where
bank credit costs decrease the period after the issue only for short-term debt, but not for long-
term, where the reduction takes place two periods later. Finally, the information provided in
column (3) shows that credit costs are not reduced for firms with multiple short-term debt
issues, (the negative coefficient of STDI cancels out with the positive coefficient of DSTDI).
This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Concerning the control variables, we can extract the following conclusions. First of
all, risk-free interest rate, MIBOR, is statistically significant to explain bank variation costs.
Increases in period-t MIBOR have a positive impact on the next-period bank credit costs.
SALES variable, as a proxy of firm size, suggest that largest companies show a lower
increase in their short-term bank costs. So, if credit costs decrease (increase) for all the
companies, large companies achieve a superior decrease (lower increase). This result relies on
the grounds of a positive correlation between firm size and its bargaining power with respect
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to banks. Another possible argument is that large companies are more likely to have banks as
shareholders, which, in principle, will be more willing to favor firm’s interests (i.e. by
reducing its credit cost). In a similar way we can justify the negative and significant
coefficient associated with bank debt variable (BDCD). Those companies with high levels of
bank debt are more likely to have banks in their ownership structure [Zoido (1998)]. Another
interesting result is the negative and significant coefficient associated with tangible assets
(TANG). These are natural collateral assets to achieve a reduction (or a lower increase,
depending on the case) in credit costs. Finally, those companies with high economic
performance (high ROA) are compensated with lower financial costs.
In order to analyze credit cost variation between period t+1 and period t+2, we
conduct a similar estimation to that of Table IV (period t), but using VSTBC1 as dependent
variable. The results are reported in Table V. However, we should mention the existence of a
couple of differences with regard to the estimations of Table IV. First, control variables are all
leaded one period. This is made to better capture the effect of period-t debt issues on next-
period credit variation costs. Second, in columns (2) and (3) STDI (short-term debt issued)
variable is leaded one period. This is to test Hypothesis 1b, and inspect whether it exists
earlier effects on the variation of credit costs linked to the short maturity of the debt issued.
We expect so according to the preliminary evidence shown in Tables II and II.
There are two important results to stress: First, in column (2) there is a negative and
significant impact of period-(t+1) short-term debt issues as well as period-t long-term debt
ones on bank variation costs between period t+1 and t+2. This finding fully supports
Hypothesis 1b. It is also consistent with the evidence reported in Table II over the amount of
new bank loans contracted after the issuing period contingent on the maturity of the debt
issued.
Second, column (3) shows that those multiple-issuing companies only show a
reduction in their credit costs if they issue long-term debt. This supports Hypothesis 2b.
We complement the previous results by reporting evidence of the issuing frequency of
short-term and long-term debt issues. As postulated in the theoretical framework, those
multiple-issuing companies show a higher frequency of short-term debt issues than of long-
term ones. In particular, 2.23 times for companies who issue only short-term debt, versus 2
times for companies who issue only long-term debt. Thus, we should expect that banks give
up to “recover” the former companies through a credit bank reduction, as those companies are
using the market mechanism very often. By contrast, if the multiple debt issues are long-term,
because they take place less often, banks can try to “recover” those companies through the
mentioned credit cost reduction. This is precisely what we find in column (3) consistently
with Hypothesis 2b.
Notice that, as expected, all control variables effects found in period-t credit cost
variation specification also holds in period-(t+1) one. Under this latter estimation all control
variables are leaded one period ahead, so they are contemporaneous to the dependent variable
like in table IV.
[INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE]
Finally, it is worth to emphasize that by satisfying the results concerning multiple debt
issues, our study allows separating informational-type theories from those based on
bargaining power relationships. The former type can explain these results but the latter do not.
In principle, companies` bargaining power should be increasing with the number of debt
issues. As a consequence, a greater bank credit cost reduction should be expected, not a lower
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as it is found. Thus, as a concluding statement, we should emphasize the importance of
informative considerations to explain the interaction between bank and market debt.
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyze the effect of firm’s debt issues, with short and long-term
maturity, on the evolution of firm’s bank credit costs. We argue over the existence of a
positive impact of these issues on the reduction of post-issues firm’s credit cost. We base this
idea upon three main arguments: i) banks can delegate to investors supervision task, a fact
that makes banks supervision costs cheaper; ii) by issuing debt, firms increase their
bargaining power with regard to banks, because the former can get funds through alternative
financial channels; iii) debt issues are interpreted as a signal of firm’s high quality.
Additionally, we argue that the shorter the maturity of the debt issued, the earlier the
reduction of bank credit costs of the issuing firm. Finally, a result concerning multiple debt
issues is stated: Firms that raise capital through frequent short-term debt issues present, on
average, a lower reduction in their credit costs than their counterparts with a unique issue.
This is no longer true for long-maturity issues. The idea is the existence of an information
signaling dilution, especially in case of short-term debt, as frequent issues are undertaken.
In order to test empirically our theoretical hypotheses, we use a sample of non-
financial Spanish firms, during the period 1993-1998. The data are gathered from a database
(SABE) of more than 200.000 firms. After implementing some filters, an unbalanced panel
data sample of 16,020 firms and 56,484 observations came out.
An initial descriptive evidence shows that companies that raise capital with short-term
debt get a reduction in their bank credit cost one period later after the issue, while those other
that use long-term debt have to wait until two periods later to achieve this reduction.
Furthermore, and consistently with this feature, the former firms obtain more new bank loans
(with these improved conditions) in the issuing periods and the following ones, while the
latter show a superior bank credit activity two periods later.
In the econometric study, once we control for the existence of fixed effects, we find
robust evidence that short-term debt issues generate a reduction in firms’ short-term bank
costs in the period after issuing. But, long-term issues effects do not appear until two periods
later. This feature confirms the theoretical discussions.
Additionally, we distinguish companies that carried out only one issue from those
others with multiple issues. The results show that credit cost reductions are not relevant for
multiple short-term debt issues. But, this is not true for long-term issues, where the cost
reduction after an initial issue is as high as that after posterior ones. This evidence is also
consistent with the theoretical framework presented.
As a limitation of our paper, there is no data on long-term bank credit costs. However,
we expect that the results for these costs would even be stronger than those found for short-
term credits. The reason is that long-term credit is a more effective way to lure issuing firms.
Thus, banks will be more willing to reduce the costs of these credits for issuing firms in order
to try to “recover” these high-quality firms.
The real implications of these findings to Spanish companies are twofold. First, we
provide evidence over the existence of additional benefits to issue debt: there is a reduction in
the post-issue credit costs. Second, the additional economic efforts to issue long-term debt are
compensated by the lasting effect on bank credit costs reductions.
Finally, we should mention that we expect to find empirical evidence in the same
direction when companies obtain funds through equity issues instead of debt ones. This is left
for future research.
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TABLE IV
EFFECT OF FIRM DEBT ISSUES ON SHORT-TERM
BANKING VARIATION COSTS BETWEEN PERIOD T AND T+1.
Fixed
effects
estimation
(1)
Fixed effects
estimation
(2)
Fixed
effects
estimation
(3)
Explanatory Variables
PID -0,026***
(2,446)
LTDI -0,010
(0,733)
-0,012
(0,843)
STDI -0,029**
(2,056)
-0,047***
(2,674)
DLTDI 0,017
(0,315)
DSTDI 0,047*
(1,759)
Control Variables
MIBOR 0,003***
(6,318)
0,003***
(6,320)
0,003***
(6,363)
BDCD -0,015***
(3,819)
-0,015***
(3,820)
-0,015***
(3,838)
LEV (exp-10) 87,0
(0,045)
87,7
(0,045)
89,2
(0,046)
CDM 0,005
(0,772)
0,005
(0,749)
0,005
(0,744)
SALES (exp-10) -2,36*
(1,556)
-2,39*
(1,580)
-2,58*
(1,697)
ROA -0,029***
(2,708)
-0,030***
(2,694)
-0,029***
(2,685)
TANG -0,026**
(1,784)
-0,025**
(1,781)
-0,025**
(1,782)
CONSTANT -0,003
(0,388)
0,003
(0,374)
0,003
(0,377)
Number of observations 18082 18082 18082
Hausman Test1 20,34
(0,009)
21,99
(0,009)
22,10
(0,024)
Goodness of Fit2 10,82
(0,000)
9,67
(0,000)
8,20
(0,000)
Sargan Test3 2,85
(0,828)
5,430
(0,607)
9,42
(0,399)
T-Statistics are in parentheses: ***p-value< 0.01, ** p-value<0.05, p-value< 0.10
1 X2 – Statistics and Hausman test p-value: equality test between fixed and random effects
models.
2  Statistics and p-values of the goodness-of-fit model. In the fixed effects case corresponds
to F-Statistics.
3 X2 –Statistics and Sargan endogeneity test p-value: equality test between ordinary least
squares and instrumental variable models. Because the fixed-effect model is the resulting
one, we apply Sargan test to the model with first differences.
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TABLE V
EFFECT OF FIRM DEBT ISSUES ON SHORT-TERM
BANKING VARIATION COSTS BETWEEN PERIOD T+2AND T+1.
Fixed
effects
estimation
(1)
Fixed effects
estimation
(2)
Fixed
effects
estimation
(3)
Explanatory Variables
LTDI -0,024
(1,371)
-0,026*
(1,611)
-0,034**
(2,021)
STDI -0,004
(0,243)
STDI1 -0,031***
(2,390)
-0,054***
(3,141)
DLTDI 0,041
(0,670)
DSTDI1 0,055**
(2,042)
Control Variables
MIBOR1 0,003***
(6,265)
0,003***
(6,220)
0,003***
(6,248)
BDCD1 -0,015***
(3,832)
-0,015***
(3,817)
-0,015***
(3,845)
LEV1 (exp-10) 85,1
(0,044)
85,1
(0,044)
86,2
(0,044)
CDM1 0,005
(0,764)
0,005
(0,757)
0,005
(0,751)
SALES1 (exp-10) -2,22
(1,463)
-2,15
(1,417)
-2,29
(1,505)
ROA1 -0,030***
(2,745)
-0,030***
(2,711)
-0,030***
(2,702)
TANG1 -0,026**
(1,816)
-0,026**
(1,797)
-0,026**
(1,805)
CONSTANT -0,003
(0,370)
-0,003
(0,349)
-0,003
(0,340)
Number of observations 18077 18077 18077
Hausman Test1 16,72
(0,053)
21,76
(0,01)
22,08
(0,02)
Goodness of Fit2 9,27
(0,000)
9,90
(0,000)
8,51
(0,000)
Sargan Test3 2,90
(0,89)
5,41
(0,79)
T-Statistics are in parentheses: ***p-value< 0.01, ** p-value<0.05, p-value< 0.10
1 X2 – Statistics and Hausman test p-value: equality test between fixed and random effects
models.
2  Statistics and p-values of the goodness-of-fit model. In the fixed effects case corresponds
to F-Statistics.
3 X2 –Statistics and Sargan endogeneity test p-value: equality test between ordinary least
squares and instrumental variable models. Because the fixed-effect model is the resulting
one, we apply Sargan test to the model with first differences.
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APPENDIX
Initial sample has been filtered. We drop all observations with one of the following
characteristics:
1. Industry Code Activity not available.
2. Only available Abbreviate Financial Statements, not the Normal ones.
3. Amount of short-term bank loans <=0
4. Amount of long-term bank loans <=0
5. All those observations with negative values in positive-defined accounts.
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